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Material Breach, Material Disclosure 
 
Tash Bottum 
  INTRODUCTION   
On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced that its servers 
had been breached, compromising the personal financial infor-
mation of as many as 143 million Americans.1 On that day, the 
Equifax stock was trading at $142.72.2 In the week following 
Equifax’s announcement, the stock price fell over thirty-three 
percent to $92.98.3 Equifax is a credit reporting agency that com-
piles and sells credit reports comprised of information regarding 
an individual’s financial history.4 The company’s database in-
cludes information concerning over 820 million consumers, over 
91 million businesses, and the employees of over 7100 employ-
ers.5 This breach damaged not only the consumers, but also the 
company’s investors6 who, at the time, owned over 120 million 
outstanding shares.7 As the details of the hack emerged, 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you 
to Professor Prentiss Cox and Professor John Matheson for their thoughtful 
comments and guidance throughout this process. I would also like to thank the 
editors and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review for their careful and consid-
erate edits. Thanks also to JGS + P, T, Q, G, S always. Copyright © 2019 by 
Tash Bottum. 
 1. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, A Brief History of Equifax Security Fails, 
FORBES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/09/ 
08/equifax-data-breach-history/#5ddff05d677c. 
 2. Equifax, Inc., NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/quote/XXXX:EFX (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2019). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See What Is a Credit Reporting Company?, CFPB, https://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-credit-reporting-company-en-1251 
(last updated May 25, 2017). 
 5. See Press Release, Equifax, Equifax Releases Details on Cybersecurity 
Incident, Announces Personnel Changes (Sept. 15, 2017), https://investor 
.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/09-15-2017-224018832.  
 6. For the purposes of this Note, “investor” or “investors” refers to a com-
pany’s shareholders. 
 7. See Equifax Shares Outstanding, Y CHARTS, https://ycharts.com/ 
companies/EFX/shares_outstanding (last updated Oct. 31, 2017). 
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Equifax’s ethics and conduct became increasingly concerning to 
both the company’s investors and the general public. 
The untimeliness of Equifax’s response—a critical compo-
nent of data breach investigations—deepened these concerns.8 
Equifax first discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017.9 How-
ever, the roots of this story trace back further. On March 8, 2017, 
security researchers at Cisco Systems, Inc. discovered a vulner-
ability in the Apache software used by Equifax.10 Apache Soft-
ware Foundation issued a patch to cure this vulnerability, and 
instructed companies to take necessary efforts to protect their 
systems.11 On May 13, hackers first accessed sensitive infor-
mation within Equifax’s databases.12 The hackers entered 
through the same vulnerability that the Apache-issued patch 
was intended to repair.13 When Equifax discovered the breach, 
they patched the vulnerability,14 but at that point, the damage 
had been done. 
From July 29 until September 7, Equifax internally re-
viewed the breach and enlisted an independent cybersecurity 
firm, Mandiant, to assist in determining “the scope of the intru-
sion, including the specific data impacted.”15 Thus, it was not 
until forty days after Equifax first discovered the breach that the 
company disclosed the event to the public and to its investors. 
During this forty-day delay, company executives within 
Equifax sold nearly $2 million worth of shares.16 Regulatory fil-
 
 8. See Stephanie Yonekura et al., Mitigating and Investigating a Cyberse-
curity Incident, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Aug. 8, 2016), https:// 
globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/the-investigations-review-of-the 
-americas-2017/1067470/mitigating-and-investigating-a-cybersecurity-incident 
(explaining that the date that the incident was discovered, confirmed, and dis-
closed will have an impact on whether the company’s response will be perceived 
as reasonable). 
 9. See Press Release, Equifax, supra note 5 (stating that on July 29, 2017, 
the company first detected suspicious activity on its servers). 
 10. See AnnaMaria Andriotis & Robert McMillan, Hackers Entered Equifax 
Systems in March, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
hackers-entered-equifax-systems-in-march-1505943617. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/. 
 14. See Press Release, Equifax, supra note 5. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Equifax Special Committee Clears Executives 
on Trades Before Breach Disclosure, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www 
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ings show that Chief Financial Officer, John Gamble; U.S. Infor-
mation Solutions President, Joseph Loughran; and Workforce 
Solutions President, Rodolfo Ploder; completed stock sales on 
August 1 and August 2, totaling roughly $1.8 million worth of 
shares.17 These transactions may not have been planned, as they 
were not listed on the company’s scheduled trading plan.18 
Equifax—as well as a committee of the company’s board of direc-
tors assembled to investigate these trades—stated the execu-
tives were unaware of the breach at the time of the trades.19 
Later investigations revealed that an additional executive—the 
now-former Chief Information Officer, Jun Ying—sold nearly 
one million shares after learning of the breach.20 Ying remains 
the only executive charged with insider trading in connection 
with this breach.21 Nonetheless, all of the executives’ trades mit-
igated their financial harm, as the trades occurred in the wake 
of a breach which would later damage the remainder of the com-
pany’s investors, large and small. 
The Equifax breach is believed to be “one of the most signif-
icant data breaches given the scope of the information dis-




 17. Id. 
 18. See Alina Selyukh, 3 Equifax Executives Sold Stock Days After Hack 
That Wasn’t Disclosed for a Month, NPR (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/08/549434187/3-equifax-executives-sold-stock 
-days-after-hack-that-wasnt-disclosed-for-a-month. A scheduled trading plan 
establishes pre-planned buying and selling of shares for a certain period of time. 
See JAMES R. TANENBAUM & BRIAN HIRSHBERG, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT RULE 10B5-1 PLANS 2 (2017). These 
plans are “especially useful” for insiders presumed to have nonpublic infor-
mation, “such as officers, directors and other affiliates,” and must be submitted 
in accordance with federal regulations. Id. 
 19. See Andriotis, supra note 16 (describing the committee’s investigation 
and findings); see also Press Release, Equifax, Equifax Board Releases Findings 
of Special Committee Regarding Stock Sale by Executives (Nov. 3, 2017), https:// 
investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/11-03-2017-124511096.  
 20. See Stacy Cowley, Ex-Equifax Executive Charged with Insider Trading 
Tied to ‘17 Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/14/business/equifax-executive-insider-trading.html. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Andriotis & McMillan, supra note 10. 
 23. See generally The Equifax Breach: An Overview, CYBERWIRE NEWS, 
https://www.thecyberwire.com/articles/the-equifax-breach-an-overview.html 
(last updated Sept. 20, 2017) (stating that while the Equifax breach is not the 
largest to have occurred, “it may be among the most damaging in effect”).  
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Following Equifax’s September 7 announcement, public atten-
tion has focused predominantly on consumer harm, demon-
strated, for example, by a fifty-state class action lawsuit alleg-
ing, among other things, that Equifax delayed informing 
consumers about the breach, thereby preventing them from mit-
igating the impending damage.24 This Note shifts the focus to 
the company’s shareholders—a group of individuals who en-
trusted Equifax with their money, and whose investments must 
pay for the damage the company caused. As of the time of this 
writing, Equifax’s stock price has yet to recover to the prean-
nouncement price.25 Thus, the shareholders continue to be 
harmed. Regardless of whether the extent of such harm could 
have been mitigated, the damage resulting from the Equifax 
data breach is material.  
While Equifax stands in the spotlight, it is not alone in its 
misfortune. In today’s age of technology, companies dedicate 
vast resources to protecting incredible amounts of data and the 
focus on cybersecurity is rapidly increasing in all industries.26 
This focus, in large part, is a reflection of the risk that content 
data breaches present. For the purposes of this Note, a “content 
data breach” is defined as a data breach that has compromised 
at least 1000 records containing consumers’ personally identifi-
able information.27 As the Equifax content data breach demon-
strates, this type of breach negatively impacts the company’s 
stock price, and in turn, its investors.28 These harms then trigger 
federal law. 
 
 24. See, e.g., id. (discussing the implications of this breach on individuals’ 
privacy); Kenneth R. Harney, Data Breach at Equifax Prompts a National 
Class-Action Suit, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/realestate/data-breach-at-equifax-prompts-a-national-class-action-suit/ 
2017/11/20/28654778-ce19-11e7-a1a3-0d1e45a6de3d_story.html?noredirect= 
on&utm_term=.38df7b6f9a3a (describing the lawsuit); Adam Shell, Equifax 
Data Breach: Number of Victims May Never Be Known, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/17/equifax-data-breach 
-number-victims-may-never-known/670618001 (“Countless Americans will no 
doubt suffer financial harm from the Equifax data breach.”). 
 25. See Equifax, Inc., supra note 2 (providing a real-time value of the stock). 
 26. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 27. See discussion infra Part III.A. This definition borrows its numeric 
threshold from a Ponemon Institute study that examines data breaches. 
PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 2 (2017) [hereinafter 
PONEMON STUDY]; see also infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
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Corporate disclosure law requires companies to report cer-
tain types of events on a current basis.29 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) disclosure regulations are currently 
governed by a vague standard of materiality that fails to ade-
quately guide companies in determining whether to disclose a 
breach.30 While often beneficial,31 the discretion that the mate-
riality standard allows is inappropriate as it applies to reporting 
content data breaches. Disclosure law aims to promote transpar-
ency, enhance informed investments, and protect investors.32 
The materiality standard harms investors by decreasing corpo-
rate transparency. A breach harms investors by decreasing the 
share price. These harms offend the purposes of federal disclo-
sure law.33 Moreover, the rate and effects of data breaches has 
risen at an alarming rate, reaching a level that demands regula-
tory attention.34 This Note proposes a new rule in lieu of apply-
ing a standard to reporting content data breaches. This new rule 
will clarify the existing ambiguity, requiring disclosure where 
the standard simply recommends disclosure. The Note argues 
that companies must disclose content data breaches within four 
days of discovery by means of the SEC’s 8-K disclosure form—
specifically, Item 2.06: Material Impairments.35 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I describes the recent 
boom of data breaches and a breach’s potential effects and costs 
before tracing the origin of SEC disclosure requirements, the 
purpose of such requirements, and the development of the SEC 
framework relating to corporate disclosures. This Part also sets 
forth the most common standard for materiality in corporate dis-
closure law. Part II discusses the distinction between a standard 
and a rule, identifies the use of standards and rules in the con-
text of corporate disclosure law, and proposes that content data 
breaches should be subject to a rule—rather than a standard—
of materiality. This Part describes the immediate justifications 
of subjecting content data breaches to a bright-line rule that re-
quires four-day disclosure through the SEC’s Form 8-K. Finally, 
Part III explores the particulars of the proposed rule and its ben-
efits and demonstrates that mandatory disclosure satisfies the 
 
 29. See infra Part I.B. 
 30. See infra Part III.C. 
 31. See infra Part I.D. 
 32. See infra Part I.A. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
 34. See infra Part II.C. 
 35. SEC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K), at 2 (2018) [hereinafter FORM  
8-K]. 
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original purposes of corporate disclosure law. Finally, this Part 
addresses the most prominent critique of this rule-based ap-
proach—the speculative nature of content data breaches, and 
the resulting difficulty in precise reporting—before concluding. 
I.  DATA BREACHES AND THE HISTORY OF SEC 
DISCLOSURE LAW   
Content data breaches are a relatively new phenomenon 
and have recently gained widespread attention.36 Company dis-
closure requirements, on the other hand, were established early 
on in disclosure law and are a central consideration of corpora-
tions today. This Part traces the recent upsurge in data breaches 
and the effects that a breach can have on a company. Next, it 
traces the enactment and development of SEC-required disclo-
sures, the purposes that Congress and the SEC intended to pro-
tect through the relevant legislation, regulations, and amend-
ments, and finally, the touchstone materiality standard used 
throughout corporate disclosure law. 
A. THE RISE AND EFFECTS OF DATA BREACHES 
Regulations governing corporate disclosures have been dy-
namic, aiming to serve the purposes of the Exchange Act, subse-
quent legislation, shifting shareholder interests, and market de-
velopments. The rise of technology, and electronically stored 
information (ESI) in recent years is a critical market change, 
presenting new threats and risks to companies of all sizes.37 One 
such threat is a content data breach,38 such as the Equifax data 
breach that was described in the Introduction. The number of 
reported breaches has increased at an alarming rate since the 
early 2000s,39 with over 1000 breaches tracked in 2016 alone—a 
 
 36. See, e.g., Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL 
GUARDIAN: DATAINSIDER (Jan. 3, 2019), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/ 
history-data-breaches (stating that the frequency of publicly-disclosed data 
breaches increased in the 1980s, with public awareness beginning to rise in the 
early 2000s). 
 37. See, e.g., De Groot, supra note 36 (explaining that the exponential 
growth of ESI provides a greater opportunity for cyber criminals to gain access 
through a breach). 
 38. See Data Breach, TREND MICRO, https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/ 
security/definition/data-breach (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (defining a data 
breach as “an incident where information is stolen or taken from a system with-
out the knowledge or authorization of the system’s owner”). 
 39. See De Groot, supra note 36. (noting an increase from 157 breaches re-
ported in 2005 to 783 breaches in 2014). 
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forty percent increase over the previous year’s number.40 Data 
breaches have short-term and long-term effects, leaving a path 
of destruction in their wake. 
Recent studies have demonstrated that data breaches nega-
tively impact the stock share price of a company at the moment 
of public announcement with years of lasting effects.41 In 2017, 
Comparitech conducted a study focusing on Wall Street’s reac-
tion to a data breach, identifying twenty-four previously 
breached companies, including Apple, Adobe Systems, eBay, 
Home Depot, JPMorgan, LinkedIn, Target, and Yahoo.42 Com-
paritech examined each of the company’s share prices prior to 
and after its public announcement of the incident, finding that a 
data breach has more of a long-term effect than an immediate 
one.43 The companies’ share prices only fell about 0.5% on aver-
age immediately following a breach.44 Three years after the 
breach, however, the stocks had dropped 41.6% in comparison to 
the NASDAQ market performance.45 Comparitech’s study also 
 
 40. See Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from 
Identity Theft Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE 
CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches (Jan. 19, 2017) (noting 
1091 reported breaches in 2016, as compared to 780 in 2015). 
 41. See Marc Butler, Data Breaches Have Measurable Impact on Long-Term 
Stock Prices, INTELLIGIZE (July 20, 2017), https://www.intelligize.com/data 
-breaches-measurable-impact-long-term-stock-prices (arguing that new re-
search and studies show that “there is indeed a measurable impact [of data 
breaches] on short- and long-term stock value”). But see Elena Kvochko & Rajiv 
Pant, Why Data Breaches Don’t Hurt Stock Prices, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 31, 
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/why-data-breaches-dont-hurt-stock-prices (argu-
ing that even significant breaches have “very little impact” on the company’s 
stock price). 
 42. Paul Bischoff, Analysis: How Data Breaches Affect Stock Market Share 
Prices, COMPARITECH (July 11, 2017), https://www.comparitech.com/blog/ 
information-security/data-breach-share-price. In particular, the study focused 
on three concerns: (1) the immediate effect of a data breach on closing share 
price compared to daily volatility; (2) the percent difference in closing share 
price performance versus the S&P 500 over the same period of time from the 
day prior to a breach; and (3) the recovery time for that percent change to return 
to zero or greater. Id. 
 43. The study used NASDAQ’s market performance as a baseline, rather 
than zero. Id. For example, if NASDAQ rose 2% and a company’s stock rose 1%, 
the study would find a 1% decrease in that company’s stock performance versus 
the market. If, however, NASDAQ fell 2% and a company’s stock rose 2%, the 
study would find a 4% increase in that company’s stock performance versus the 
market. Id. 
 44. The one-half percent drop was found to be within the standard devia-
tion for daily volatility, rendering it statistically insignificant. Id. One year after 
the breach, the twenty-four companies’ stocks underperformed NASDAQ by 
7.33% on average. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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found negative long-term effects in the postbreach growth rate 
relative to the prebreach growth rate. While companies’ share 
prices ultimately continued to increase following a data breach, 
postbreach growth, averaging 14.8%, was minute in comparison 
to prebreach growth, which averaged 45.6%.46 While this study 
examined only significant data breaches,47 it found that the 
smallest analyzed breaches—those with a lower number of rec-
ords compromised—impacted share prices the most.48 This 
demonstrates that a breach does not need to be of equal magni-
tude to the Equifax breach in order to harm shareholders. Ulti-
mately, the described decrease in market value resulting from a 
content data breach damages shareholders.49 
Additionally, data breaches result in both direct and indirect 
costs to the company, restricting its ability to grow in directions 
in which it otherwise would have been capable.50 A data breach 
in the United States costs $7.35 million on average, which in 
turn, impacts a company’s profitability.51 For example, Equifax 
risks spending over $100 million dollars in costs,52 in addition to 
 
 46. The study looked at share price growth in the three years prior to and 
three years after a data breach. Id. 
 47. In order to qualify for the study, the company must have: (1) been pub-
licly listed, preferably on the New York Stock Exchange; (2) experienced a 
breach affecting one million or more records; and (3) publicly disclosed the 
breach. Id.  
 48. These breaches impacted 1–10 million company records and resulted in 
a 2% initial drop, 21-day recovery, and 5.91% subsequent drop 165 days after 
the breach. Id. The study also analyzed the companies’ stock prices based on 
time of breach, the companies’ industries, and sensitivity of stolen information. 
Id.; see also David Ruiz, Data Breaches Have Lingering Effect on Stock Prices, 
Study Says, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.law.com/ 
corpcounsel/sites/corpcounsel/2017/07/11/data-breaches-have-lingering-effect 
-on-stock-prices-study-says (discussing the Comparitech study and summariz-
ing its results). 
 49. See Press Release, SEC, Statement on Cybersecurity (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-170 (stating that one of the risks 
associated with a data breach is “investor losses resulting from the theft of funds 
or market value declines in companies subject to cyberattacks”). 
 50. See Michael Peters, Post Equifax, New Data Breach Notification Laws 
Are Inevitable, SECURITY BOULEVARD (Jan. 10, 2018), https://securityboulevard 
.com/2018/01/post-equifax-new-data-breach-notification-laws-are-inevitable 
(quoting SEC Chairman, Jay Clayton, stating that cyber breaches are “one of 
the greatest risks to the financial system right now”). See generally Emily Moss-
burg et al., The Hidden Costs of an IP Breach, 19 DELOITTE REV. 106, 118 (2016) 
(arguing that due to the “importance to growth market share, and innova-
tion . . . cyber risk should rightly sit with other strategic initiatives managed at 
the C-suite level”). 
 51. PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 5, 10. 
 52. Mike Lennon, Equifax: Hack Related Expenses Cost Company $87.5 
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facing a multibillion-dollar lawsuit.53 First, a data breach results 
in direct costs,54 such as those related to engaging a forensic ex-
pert or cybersecurity firm to investigate the breach55 and im-
proving security measures moving forward.56 For example, to 
thoroughly investigate and report its breach, Equifax incurred 
$17.1 million in professional fees.57 Additionally, a company will 
often engage outside counsel to manage the expected litigation.58 
Finally, breached companies offer identity protection services 
and remedial options to its consumer base.59 For example, 
Equifax announced three postbreach consumer protection offer-
ings to mitigate consumer harm,60 including credit monitoring,61 
freezing services,62 and a “credit lock” tool.63 These offerings will 
 
Million in Q3, SECURITY WK. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.securityweek.com/ 
equifax-hack-related-expenses-cost-company-875-million-q3. 
 53. See Polly Mosendz, Equifax Faces Multibillion-Dollar Lawsuit over 
Hack, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2017-09-08/equifax-sued-over-massive-hack-in-multibillion-dollar-lawsuit (de-
scribing a class action against Equifax by over 143 million consumers). 
 54. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 29 (defining direct costs as “the 
direct expense outlay to accomplish a given activity”). 
 55. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BREACH RESPONSE: A GUIDE FOR BUSI-
NESS 1 (2016) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (instructing companies to identify an 
independent data forensics team to help determine the source and scope of the 
breach, analyze the collected evidence, and advise on remediation steps). 
 56. Contra Erik Sherman, The Reason Companies Don’t Fix Cybersecurity, 
CBS (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-reason-companies 
-dont-fix-cybersecurity (suggesting the return is not worth large companies’ in-
vestments in data protection measures, because the losses are small compared 
to the revenue of these corporate “behemoth[s]”). 
 57. Lennon, supra note 52. 
 58. FTC REPORT, supra note 55, at 1 (instructing companies to consult with 
in-house attorneys before hiring outside counsel with privacy and data security 
expertise who may advise on applicable law and requirements). But see BRYAN 
CAVE, 2017 DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 3 (2017) (finding that due to 
standing issues for the plaintiff, the risk that a company will face litigation fol-
lowing a data breach is relatively low). 
 59. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Can Equifax’s Offerings Actually Protect 
Your Identity?, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax 
-identity-protection-offerings (quoting the founder of data security and privacy 
firm CyberScout, Adam Levin, as saying “[i]n the event something goes 
wrong, . . . companies need to respond urgently, transparently, and empatheti-
cally”). 
 60. See id. (describing and discussing Equifax’s response measures). 
 61. A credit-monitoring service sends an individual an alert so he or she 
may catch suspicious activity earlier than later. Id. 
 62. A freezing service locks down an individual’s credit files that requires 
new entities to get specific permission and pin numbers from the individual be-
fore accessing his or her information for the first time. Id. 
 63. A “credit lock” tool allows consumers to lock and unlock access to their 
data at any time. Id. 
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cost Equifax approximately $14.9 million.64 Nonetheless, 
breached companies often institute these services and options in 
the hopes of increasing consumer retention and its general pub-
lic perception.65 
Customer retention and public perception themselves are 
among the indirect costs66 of a data breach.67 A breach can 
greatly harm consumer and shareholder trust, which culminates 
in decreased customer attainment and retention, and ultimately 
a devaluation of the brand itself.68 Recent studies have found 
that the average loss to brand value following a data breach 
ranged from $184 to $332 million.69 A further indirect cost is lost 
business,70 a term which encompasses not only “reputation 
losses and diminished goodwill,” but also broader costs.71 These 
broader costs include increased difficulty in attracting new cus-
tomers72 and loss of intellectual property and trade secrets.73 
When a company loses its intellectual property and trade se-
crets, its competitive edge is compromised.74 The company may 
 
 64. Lennon, supra note 52. 
 65. See Why Companies Should Offer Post-Breach Monitoring Services, EX-
PERIAN (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.experian.com/blogs/data-breach/2017/08/04/ 
companies-offer-post-breach-monitoring-services (finding that companies who 
successfully help consumers results in better retention and prevents losing con-
sumers to the competition). 
 66. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 29 (defining indirect costs as 
“the amount of time, effort[,] and other organizational resources allocated to 
data breach resolution, but not as a direct cash outlay”). 
 67. See id. at 22 (measuring “reputation losses and diminished goodwill”). 
 68. See The Consequences of a Cyber Security Breach, SUNGARD AVAILABIL-
ITY SERVICES., https://www.sungardas.com/en/cyber-security-advice/articles/ 
the-consequences-of-a-cyber-security-breach.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
 69. PONEMON INST., 2011 REPUTATION IMPACT OF A DATA BREACH 1 (2011). 
But see Sherman, supra note 56 (stating that “[n]ew customer acquisition can 
be a problem, but probably not a permanent one,” and claiming that the public’s 
perception is back to normal within six months of a breach). 
 70. See PONEMON STUDY, supra note 27, at 22 (finding that the average lost 
business cost over a period of twelve years was $4.13 million). 
 71. PONEMON INST., 2011, supra note 69. 
 72. See 86% of Customers Would Shun Brands Following a Data Breach, 
SEMAFONE (Mar. 2014), https://semafone.com/press-releases/86-customers 
-shun-brands-following-data-breach (finding that eighty-six percent of survey 
participants either were very unlikely to or would not do business with a com-
pany that had previously experienced a data breach involving financial infor-
mation). 
 73. Mossburg et al., supra note 50, at 108. 
 74. Id. (suggesting that while there are fewer upfront, direct costs, “losing 
IP could mean forfeiture of first-to-market advantage, loss of profitability, or—
in the worst case—losing entire lines of business to competitors or counterfeit-
ers”). 
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not realize the extent of the resulting competitive disadvantage 
until much later, after observing that several “strategies fail to 
yield positive results.”75 This risk is particularly pronounced 
when a company, such as Equifax, does not discover the breach 
for an extended period of time.76  
These types of damages and harms that result from data 
breaches are of the type that prompted Congress to create a fed-
eral disclosure regime and a governing agency to ensure compli-
ance. The remainder of this Part details this regime. 
B. PURPOSE AND PROCEDURES OF THE 1933 AND 1934 
SECURITIES ACT 
Each shareholder holds a right to future cash flow of the cor-
poration.77 This right, in turn, creates an interest in the com-
pany. Until 1933, effective market regulation was nonexistent 
and market information was rarely available to the individual 
investor as a result.78 Individuals nonetheless continued invest-
ing until the unprecedented market crash in 1929.79 In 1933, 
President Franklin Roosevelt urged Congress to adopt measures 
to regulate the national securities market, a move which would 
be “but one step in [its] broad purpose of protecting investors.”80 
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) reflected this desire to protect 
investors and to promote efficiency.81 The Securities Act requires 
 
 75. 3 Long Term-Data Breach Consequences, GLOBALSCAPE (Nov. 11, 2013), 
https://www.globalscape.com/blog/2013/11/11/3-long-termdata-breach 
-consequences. 
 76. See supra notes 9, 11, and accompanying text (stating that Equifax first 
discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017, though the hackers first began 
accessing information on May 13, 2017). 
 77. See, e.g., Michael J. Mauboussin, What Shareholder Value Is Really 
About, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/10/ceos-must 
-understand-what-crea (stating that investors essentially make “short-term 
bets on long-term outcomes,” while explaining that the “value of the business is 
the present value of future cash flows”). 
 78. See Giulio Pontecorvo, Investment Banking and Security Speculation in 
the Late 1920’s, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 166, 168 (1958) (stating that the “American 
capital market in the 1920’s was still independent of any significant constraints 
on freedom of action” both from governmental entities and large institutional 
investors); see also What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo 
.html (last updated June 10, 2013) (explaining that prior to 1929, there was 
“little support for federal regulation of the securities markets”). 
 79. See Gene Smiley, US Economy in the 1920s, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(2004), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-u-s-economy-in-the-1920s. 
 80. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2 (1934).  
 81. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f )  (2012); see also H.R. 
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companies to register publicly-offered securities, which Congress 
hoped would enable investors to make more informed business 
judgments.82 The Exchange Act established the SEC83 and 
granted it power to provide for periodic reporting requirements 
in order to supplement an investor’s ability to form a well-rea-
soned judgment of the value of securities he or she buys and 
sells.84 This legislation granted the SEC broad authority, allow-
ing the agency to promulgate rules and regulations to achieve 
the Exchange Act’s purpose: protecting investors and enhancing 
transparency to allow for informed investments.85 
The SEC has used its broad discretion to create an elaborate 
scheme of disclosure requirements, which apply to most U.S. 
public companies. For example, the SEC mandates that publicly 
traded companies file quarterly reports, or 10-Qs, which include 
information regarding stock repurchases, inventory turnover, 
changes in working capital, and potential legal risks, such as 
lawsuits.86 SEC rules and regulations have evolved throughout 
over time in response to the purpose of the Exchange Act, shift-
ing investor interests, and external events that make certain in-
formation more relevant to a company’s shareholders. This ap-
proach is consistent with Congress’s original intent to create a 
 
REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2 (explaining that the Act was intended to rectify the dan-
gerous speculation of securities that characterized the 1920s). The Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce attributed this “excessive” speculation pri-
marily to “inadequate corporate reporting,” which resulted in investor ignorance 
of critical factors necessary for “intelligent judgment of the values of securities.” 
Id. at 4–5. 
 82. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, https://www 
.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). This man-
datory registration form requires companies to disclose: (1) a description of the 
company’s properties and business; (2) a description of the security to be offered 
for sale; (3) information about the management of the company; and (4) finan-
cial statements certified by independent accountants. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77g (establishing requirements for SEC registration).  
 83. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g.  
 84. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6. 
 85. See id. at 6–7 (recognizing that an administrative agency is best suited 
to adopt regulations in a field such as securities where “practices constantly 
vary”). 
 86. See Joshua Kennon, Annual Reports, 10-Ks, and 10-Qs, THE BALANCE 
(June 29, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/annual-reports-10k-10q-357266. 
This form provides investors with information that “give[s] insight into changes 
that are happening in a business long before those changes show up in the earn-
ings figures.” Id. 
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stable and efficient market, which will, in turn, attract further 
investment to fuel growth.87 
C. AMENDMENTS TO AND EXPANSIONS OF THE 1933 AND 1934 
ACT 
Shareholder interests are an influential factor in SEC rule-
making. In some instances, lack of shareholder interest has been 
influential in the SEC’s decision not to impose additional disclo-
sure requirements. For example, in 1975, the SEC concluded 
that disclosure related to social-policy interests was not neces-
sary.88 In so deciding, the agency noted that corporations had not 
received a significant number of social inquiries from their 
shareholders, and further, that the few shareholder proposals 
relating to social policy had received extremely low shareholder 
support.89 In other instances, shareholder interest has prompted 
the SEC to impose additional requirements. In the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis, the SEC amended its rules in 2009, provid-
ing investors with greater insight as to how managers of corpo-
rations oversee risk taking.90 The agency promulgated the 
amendments in response to investors’ increased focus on corpo-
rate accountability and “desire for additional information that 
would enhance their ability to make informed voting and invest-
ment decisions.”91 
 
 87. See Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Re-
quirements of the Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 784–85 
(1982) (summarizing the “subsidiary” purposes of the Exchange Act as (1) im-
proved pricing mechanisms resulting from informed investor assessments; (2) 
enhanced investor confidence, leading to increased stability and greater infu-
sions of capital for industry and commerce; and (3) deterrence of corporate mis-
conduct); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (“The idea of a free and open 
public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and 
sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the mar-
ket price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.”). 
 88. See Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656, 51,656 
(proposed Nov. 6, 1975) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 249); cf. Barnali 
Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 195–98 (2016) (dis-
cussing whether social disclosure requirements—disclosures that are related to 
social issues—help or harm shareholder interests in today’s marketplace). 
 89. Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. at 51,664 (noting a 
two to three percent voting approval on these issues in recent years). 
 90. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,334 (Dec. 
23, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274). 
 91. Id. The SEC stated that investors supported “the manner in which [the 
SEC] proposed to achieve these objectives,” and ultimately adopted the amend-
ments, despite opposition from “other commentators.” Id. at 68,335. 
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Additionally, the SEC has adopted rules in response to ex-
ternal events or societal changes that render particular infor-
mation more important to shareholders. The SEC’s 2009 amend-
ments, promulgated in response to external events such as the 
2008 financial crisis92 and the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002, demonstrate this flexibility.93 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
itself, added new and expanded existing disclosure requirements 
that would provide greater investor protection.94 The enactment 
of this Act was largely due to Enron’s unexpected filing for bank-
ruptcy, demonstrating Congress’s desire to regulate in response 
to events affecting the economy95—such as content data 
breaches—thus, endorsing the SEC’s choice to do the same. Ad-
ditionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act further expanded the SEC’s 
resources and authority to effectively regulate in the face of the 
securities market’s “unprecedented growth and change.”96 
D. FORM 8-K AND ITS 2004 EXPANSION 
In 2004, the SEC invoked its authority to widen the scope of 
Form 8-K, a form used to notify investors of specified events on 
a periodic basis.97 Form 8-K allows companies to release infor-
 
 92. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 
35,076, 35,080 (July 17, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 270, 
274) (explaining that volatility in stock price, “such as the significant decreases 
during 2008” affect total compensation, thus demonstrating that disclosure re-
quirements relating to compensation policies are necessary). 
 93. Id. at 35,083 (explaining that “developments, such as the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and corporate-governance related listing stand-
ards . . . have brought about significant changes in the structure and composi-
tion of corporate boards” thus demonstrating that disclosure requirements re-
lated to director qualifications are necessary). 
 94. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (cod-
ified in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 95. See S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 29 (2002) (“This Committee recognizes from 
the recent experience of Enron Corp. and other public companies the need for 
additional types of disclosures.”). The Report references testimony of the former 
SEC Chairman, Richard Breeden, following the Enron scandal, in which he 
urges additional disclosure requirements for “off-balance sheet transactions and 
debt.” Id. at 28 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Id. at 40. 
 97. FORM 8-K, supra note 35; see also Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Re-
quirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,914, 42,914 (June 
25, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed 2002 Rule] (providing that the SEC created 
Form 8-K in 1936, “as the form to be used by companies to file ‘current’ reports 
when specific extraordinary corporate events occur” (citing Release No. 34-925 
(Nov. 11, 1936))). 
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mation that the Exchange Act, and other rules promulgated pur-
suant to this Act, require companies to disclose.98 For example, 
Regulation Fair Disclosures (FD) requires companies to make 
market-sensitive information available to all parties—including 
institutional investors, individual investors, and the general 
public—at the same time.99 A company may fulfill this require-
ment with an 8-K filing containing such market-sensitive infor-
mation.100 
The 2004 Final Rule (the 2004 Rule) expanded the number 
of reportable events on Form 8-K.101 Specifically, the 2004 Rule 
added eight new items to the form, transferred two items from 
the periodic reports, and expanded disclosures under two items 
on the former Form 8-K.102 Additionally, the 2004 Rule reor-
ganized the disclosure items into topical categories and short-
ened the filing deadline to four business days after the occur-
rence of a triggering event.103 Ultimately, these changes 
increased Form 8-K’s power to facilitate timely communication 
between a company and its shareholders, as well as the public. 
Indeed, the amendments were a response to the ‘real time issuer 
disclosure’ mandate in Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002,104 and are intended to benefit investors.105 The SEC ex-
plained: 
 
 98. FORM 8-K, supra note 35. 
 99. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 
51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). 
 100. FORM 8-K, supra note 35, at 2 (stating that Form 8-K “shall be used 
for . . . reports of nonpublic information required to be disclosed by Regulation 
FD” and that the form “satisfies all the substantive requirements” of the FD 
regulation). 
 101. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of 
Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,594 (Mar. 25, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249) [hereinafter 2004 Rule]; see also Proposed 2002 
Rule, supra note 97, at 42,914 (stating the then-current Form 8-K requirements 
as including nine disclosure items and a five-day filing deadline). See generally 
17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2018) (providing that Form 8-K will be used for “current 
reports”).  
 102. 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,596. 
 103. See id.; cf. Proposed 2002 Rule, supra note 97, at 42,914 (stating that 
the former filing deadline was five days). The 2004 Rule additionally adopts a 
limited “safe harbor” provision from liability for failure to timely file a Form 8-
K for certain items. 2004 Rule, supra note 101, at 15,606.  
 104. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 409, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) (requiring “rapid and 
current” disclosure of such information as the SEC determines necessary “for 
the protection of investors”). 
 105. See 2004 Rule, supra note 101.  
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Under the previous Form 8-K regime, companies were required to re-
port very few significant corporate events. The limited number of Form 
8-K disclosure items permitted a public company to delay disclosure of 
many significant events until the due date for its next periodic report. 
During such a delay, the market was unable to assimilate such undis-
closed information into the value of a company’s securities. The revi-
sions that we adopt today will benefit markets by increasing the num-
ber of unquestionably or presumptively material events that must be 
disclosed currently. They will also provide investors with better and 
more timely disclosure of important corporate events.106 
Thus, the SEC hoped that the 2004 Rule would promote trans-
parency by increasing the frequency and volume of corporate re-
porting. The current Form 8-K now lists nine Sections contain-
ing a total of twenty-two Items that companies must disclose 
within four days to their investors and the public.107 Most rele-
vant for the purposes of this Note is Item 2.06: Material Impair-
ments, listed under the Financial Information heading of Section 
Two.108 A company triggers this disclosure requirement when it 
“concludes that a material charge for impairment to one or more 
of its assets, including, without limitation, an impairment of se-
curities or goodwill, is required under generally accepted ac-
counting principles applicable to the company.”109 The broad cov-
erage of this catch-all item110 reflects the SEC’s intent to 
encourage corporate transparency in order to protect inves-
tors.111 
E. MATERIALITY AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAW 
Materiality is a familiar concept in securities law, continu-
ously appearing in statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions. 
 
 106. Id. at 15,594–95.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 15,601.  
 109. Id. The company must disclose information including: (1) “impaired as-
set or assets and the facts and circumstances leading to the conclusion that the 
charge for impairment is required;” (2) “the company’s estimate of the amount 
or range of amounts of the impairment charge;” and (3) “the company’s estimate 
of the amount or range of amounts of the impairment charge that will result in 
future cash expenditures.” Id. 
 110. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Proposed 2002 Rule, supra note 97, at 42,915 (discussing the expan-
sion of 8-K requirements and imposition of deadlines throughout history in or-
der to provide investors with “timely, high-quality” information, and noting this 
Rule as the latest such expansion). 
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Congress incorporated the materiality standard first into the Se-
curities Act,112 and then again one year later, in the Exchange 
Act.113 Throughout its course of developing a disclosure frame-
work, the SEC has similarly infused the materiality standard 
into rules and regulations.114 Often, the SEC dedicates hundreds 
of pages to detailed disclosure requirements, followed by a catch-
all obligation to disclose “all other material information.”115 Item 
2.06: Material Impairments on Form 8-K is one such catch-all.116 
Thus, for more than eighty years, materiality has been the 
touchstone of securities law, governing the way in which compa-
nies must disclose information to the public and investors.117 
This Section will provide the most commonly used definition of 
materiality and the justifications for this definition’s widespread 
adoption. 
1. Defining the Standard 
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided TSC Industries, 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc. and articulated the definition of material-
ity that is most commonly accepted today: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea-
 
 112. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771q (2012) (declaring it unlawful to 
“obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact 
or any omission to state a material fact”). 
 113. Securities Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (imposing liability on 
any person “who shall make or cause to be made any false and misleading state-
ment of material fact in any application, report, or document filed under the 
act”). 
 114. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2018) (governing the selling and pur-
chasing of securities); id. § 243.100 (governing simultaneous disclosure to in-
vestment institutions, individual investors, and the public). 
 115. See, e.g., id. § 240.12b–20 (governing reports, forms and schedules filed 
under the Exchange Act); 18 C.F.R. § 385.408 (2018) (governing forms filed un-
der the Securities Act). 
 116. FORM 8-K, supra note 35, at 2. 
 117. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, THE MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR PUBLIC COM-
PANY DISCLOSURE: MAINTAIN WHAT WORKS 3 (2015) [hereinafter BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE] (arguing that the concept of materiality has been the “corner-
stone” of securities laws since Congress first embedded it in the Securities Act). 
The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers collectively 
leading companies with more than seven trillion dollars in annual revenues and 
more than sixteen million employees. Id. at 1. 
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sonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of infor-
mation made available.118 
The Court reaffirmed this standard in Basic v. Levinson, empha-
sizing that the determination of whether a piece of information 
is material is an “inherently fact-specific finding.”119 
Subsequently, the SEC and companies subject to SEC regu-
lations have adopted the TSC Industries standard. For example, 
in 1982, the SEC amended Rule 405 under the Exchange Act and 
expressly adopted the “reasonable investor” materiality stand-
ard.120 Companies rely on this definition when preparing annual 
and periodic reports under SEC regulations.121 Courts across the 
nation have used this standard when determining liability in se-
curities suits.122 This widespread adoption may support relying 
on the “reasonable investor” standard when determining mate-
riality in the future. 
2. The Reason for the Materiality Standard’s Prominence  
The “reasonable investor” standard focuses attention di-
rectly on the issue Congress identified in its enactment of the 
 
 118. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). TSC In-
dustries followed the Court’s previous attempt to define materiality in Mills v. 
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Mills, the Court defined material 
information as information “of such a character that it might have been consid-
ered important by a reasonable shareholder” in the voting process. Id. at 384. 
The Court stated that this definition most closely comports with the SEC’s pol-
icies in protecting investors and is “fully consistent with Mills.” TSC Indus., 426 
U.S. at 449. Some scholars have argued that by leaving Mills intact, the earlier 
decision cabined and constrained the latter’s opportunity to define the critical 
term. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of 
“Material” in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 175–76 (2011) (arguing 
that Court should have overruled Mills and “started from scratch”). 
 119. 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (finding “no valid justification” for excluding 
pre-merger talks and insider trading from the TSC Industries definition of ma-
teriality). Proxy fraud and insider trading are prohibited by Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rule 10b–5, respectively. Securities Exchange Act 
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2018). 
 120. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b–20 (defining materiality as “those mat-
ters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security registered”). 
 121. See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 3 (describing the SEC’s 
history of defining materiality). 
 122. See, e.g., Dalberth v. Xerox Corp., 766 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To 
fulfill the materiality requirement, ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information available.’” 
(quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988))); Petrie v. Elec. 
Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). 
  
2019] MATERIAL BREACH & DISCLOSURE 2113 
 
Acts of 1933 and 1934.123 Congress established both these Acts 
and the SEC to protect investors and to eliminate unnecessary 
speculation from the securities market.124 Writing for the Court 
in TSC Industries, Justice Marshall directly acknowledged that 
the “reasonable investor” standard must achieve this purpose.125 
Before articulating the standard, Justice Marshall clarified that 
the court was not just guided by an intent to reach a judicially 
fair and equitable outcome, but more importantly, to “ensure dis-
closures by corporate management in order to enable the share-
holders to make an informed choice.”126 
Moreover, the “reasonable investor” standard strikes the 
balance that the notion of materiality strives to achieve.127 In 
TSC Industries, Justice Marshall recognized the danger in a ma-
teriality bar that is too low by noting that some information is so 
“dubious” that disclosure of such would result only in investor 
confusion and excessive corporate compliance costs.128 Thus, in 
order to avoid liability under a broad definition of materiality, 
companies would be tempted to “bury the shareholders in an av-
alanche of trivial information[,] a result that is hardly conducive 
to informed decisionmaking.”129 Furthermore, issues and con-
cerns become more and less important to shareholders as socie-
tal circumstances change. Framing the standard in the perspec-
tive of a reasonable investor allows the standard to evolve with 
developments in the broader economy.130 
While the “reasonable investor” is widely adopted and 
achieves several objectives in securities law, it is not without 
flaws. The standard often looks backward, assessing materiality 
after the fact in a court proceeding with the benefit of additional 
 
 123. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (detailing the history and 
background of the Securities Act and Exchange Act). 
 124. See H.R. REP. NO. 73–1383, at 1–2 (1934) (capturing President Roose-
velt’s recommendation to Congress to enact legislation—the Exchange Act—to 
provide regulation in order to protect investors). 
 125. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10 (1976) (“In 
defining materiality . . . we are, of course, giving content to a rule promulgated 
by the SEC pursuant to broad statutory authority to promote ‘the public inter-
est’ and ‘the protection of investors.’” (citations omitted)). 
 126. Id. at 448. 
 127. See infra notes 160–64 and accompanying text (discussing the balance 
that the materiality standard strikes). 
 128. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448. 
 129. Id. at 448–49. 
 130. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 8 (explaining that the stand-
ard provides a “framework for addressing new issues and shedding issues whose 
importance has waned”). 
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facts, empirical evidence, market reactions, and actual signifi-
cance to shareholders.131 As there is little guidance beyond the 
standard itself, firms and courts may develop their own rules of 
thumb to use as thresholds when assessing materiality.132 While 
discouraged by the SEC,133 numeric thresholds are difficult to 
resist in assessing an ambiguous standard.134 Additionally, this 
standard provides large firms with more leeway in interpreting 
materiality than it does for small firms.135 A larger firm entails 
a larger and more complex “total mix of information,”136 in turn, 
raising the threshold at which information will become mate-
rial.137 This higher threshold then allows larger firms to inter-
pret materiality and to avoid disclosing events with a flexibility 
 
 131. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 788 
(2004) (explaining that when presented with the occurrence of a bad event, a 
judge is more likely to determine that a prior event rendered disclosure neces-
sary based on the present knowledge that the event occurred). See generally id. 
at 788–91 (discussing hindsight bias as it relates to determinations of material-
ity). Recent SEC regulations urge entities to focus on expected market reactions 
to information, leaving the courts to use price impact as a proxy for materiality. 
See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dis-
positive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 183, 199–201 (2009) (collecting cases that demonstrate that materiality 
assessments depend on a showing of post-disclosure price movement). 
 132. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 
(1999), https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm (stating that many com-
panies and auditors use a five percent threshold as a rule of thumb in assessing 
materiality); see also Parnes v. Gateway 2000, 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the defendant’s alleged overstatement of assets by $6.8 million—
amounting to two percent of the fast-growing company’s total assets—was not 
material because a reasonable investor “would not have been put off by an asset 
column that was 2% smaller”). 
 133. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,151 (stat-
ing that numerical thresholds may only be used as an “initial step in assessing 
materiality” and further, that materiality cannot be reduced to a quantitative 
formula). The SEC Staff elaborates, explaining that the totality of circum-
stances must be accounted for, including both quantitative and qualitative con-
siderations. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., Sarah Johnson, SEC, PCAOB Pushed to Define Materiality, 
CFO (June 20, 2007), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2007/06/sec-pcaob 
-pushed-to-define-materiality (discussing auditors’ desires for the SEC to estab-
lish quantitative measures for materiality). 
 135. See generally George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and 
Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 625–42 
(2017) (demonstrating, in the context of certain disclosure areas, how material-
ity provides larger firms with greater flexibility in assessing materiality).  
 136. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 137. See Georgiev, supra note 135, at 625 (“The size and complexity of large 
firms gives them a much larger ‘total mix,’ which—in turn—sets a very high 
threshold for what should . . . be disclosed.”). 
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unavailable to smaller firms.138 Despite these flaws, however, 
materiality and the TSC Industries standard remain prominent 
in the realm of corporate disclosure law. 
The SEC embodies materiality as a guidepost for regulating 
in response to shareholder interests and changing externalities, 
and ultimately, in fulfilling the purposes of disclosure law. The 
agency’s mandate from Congress to adopt regulations in the face 
of market changes in combination with its administrative flexi-
bility allows the SEC to explicitly impose disclosure regulations 
relating to content data breaches. The remainder of this Note 
argues that the SEC should take such action via a rule, rather 
than a standard. 
II.  A RULE—RATHER THAN A STANDARD—OF 
MATERIALITY   
Part I of this Note discussed the SEC’s authority to mandate 
corporate disclosures, the purposes the SEC aims to promote 
through such mandates, and the standard it often uses to trigger 
disclosure. Part II challenges the use of a standard, arguing in-
stead for a bright line rule which will provide clarity by requiring 
that companies disclose content data breaches. This Part first 
briefly discusses the distinction between a standard and a rule 
before examining contexts in which the SEC has elected to use a 
rule, as opposed to its familiar standard, to establish an event’s 
materiality. Finally, this Part concludes that a rule is better 
suited to establish a content data breach’s materiality.  
A. RULE OR STANDARD: THE DISTINCTION 
The decision—and its accompanying tradeoffs—between a 
rule and a standard is a familiar topic in legal literature.139 The 
difference between the two is in large part a degree of specificity. 
 
 138. See id. at 609 (explaining that this size discrepancy may result in an 
unfair competitive advantage to larger firms, who, for example, may be able to 
acquire a small company for an “immaterial” value, therefore avoiding disclo-
sure and gaining advantage over a smaller firm, who, by doing the same, would 
be required to disclose such acquisition).  
 139. See generally, e.g., Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 
YALE L.J. 644 (2014); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Su-
preme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 953 (1995). 
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Rules are bright-line: they provide explicit guidance, leaving lit-
tle room for future improvisation.140 Standards, on the other 
hand, are flexible: they require particular application, ebbing 
and flowing with differing sets of facts and circumstances.141 
Rules embody specificity. When Congress, the Supreme 
Court, or an administrative agency enacts a rule, they create 
uniformity, enhance predictability, and decrease the cost of de-
cision making.142 To that end, rules prevent “official arbitrari-
ness.”143 A rule can either prohibit or require conduct—such as 
requiring disclosure of content data breaches. This bright-line 
clarity prevents entities, such as judges, from arbitrarily finding 
the regulated actors either complied with or violated the rule in 
any given circumstance.144 Relatedly, if regulated parties know 
with certainty what conduct is prohibited or required, and there-
fore, what conduct violates the rule, they are better able and 
more likely to conform their conduct to the rule’s prescription.145 
Additionally, this decreases compliance costs, often incurred in 
the form of legal fees.146 
Rules, however, lack flexibility. For example, when the SEC 
issues a rule rather than a standard, it prohibits itself from de-
veloping and shaping that rule with time.147 This sacrifices the 
ability to apply case-specific precision in order to best promote 
the goals and purposes underlying the rule.148 Such a lack of pre-
cision often leads to over- and under-inclusion.149 Additionally, a 
rule is costly to enact, requiring a much greater investment in 
 
 140. See Sullivan, supra note 139, at 58 (stating that a “legal directive is 
‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the 
presence of delimited triggering facts”). 
 141. See id. (stating that a “legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to 
collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background prin-
ciple or policy to a fact situation”). 
 142. See Coenen, supra note 139, at 652 (noting that a rule “falls toward the 
high end of the specificity spectrum”). 
 143. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1688 (“[R]ules . . . are the restraint of 
official arbitrariness . . . .”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1688–89 (“[I]f private actors can know in advance the incidence 
of official intervention, they will adjust their activities in advance to take ac-
count of them.”). 
 146. See Kaplow, supra note 139, at 571–72 (discussing the cost of legal ad-
vice under rules versus standards). 
 147. See Coenen, supra note 139, at 646 (explaining that standards permit 
“nuance, flexibility, and case-specific deliberation”). 
 148. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1689 (noting that rules lack case-spe-
cific deliberation). 
 149. Id. 
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resources to determine the appropriate threshold at which to im-
pose liability.150 These drawbacks simultaneously function as 
the benefits of a standard. 
When Congress, the Supreme Court, or an administrative 
agency sets forth a standard, they allow space for future consid-
erations and the ability to decide issues on a case-by-case ba-
sis.151 Common examples of standards are reasonableness, due 
care, fairness, good faith, and—most importantly for this Note’s 
purposes—materiality.152 The generality of a standard allows its 
initial enactment to remain broad, covering wide subject matter 
and leaving gaps for future adjudications to fill with nuanced 
guidance.153 In this endeavor, a judge will assess particular facts 
in terms of the purposes or social values underlying the stand-
ard, striving to avoid over- and under-inclusion.154 This approach 
is particularly effective when “the range of relevant variables is 
very wide and [] rigidly rule-bound decisions could produce much 
error and injustice.”155 Standards, however, entail high compli-
ance costs, uncertainty, and unpredictability—each of which, a 
rule counters.156 Nonetheless, due to the broad factors relevant 
to the securities market, the SEC has often opted to issue stand-
ards, rather than rules, in its regulatory efforts. 
B. RULE OR STANDARD: WHEN AND WHERE FOR THE SEC 
The SEC has embedded a materiality standard into much of 
its regulatory framework.157 Like most standards, materiality is 
often a facts and circumstances analysis.158 Through this ap-
proach, the SEC strives to strike a balance between over- and 
 
 150. See Kaplow, supra note 139, at 577–78 (explaining that “[r]ules cost 
more to promulgate” than standards). 
 151. See Coenen, supra note 139, at 646 (explaining that standards permit 
“nuance, flexibility, and case-specific deliberation”). 
 152. Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1688. 
 153. See id. at 1689 (describing the purpose of a general standard). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 993. 
 156. Coenen, supra note 139, at 649 (elaborating on the pros and cons of 
rules and standards). 
 157. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (describing the “reason-
able investor” standard). 
 158. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (declaring 
that materiality involves “the application of a legal standard to a particular set 
of facts”); see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (noting that ma-
teriality turns on the facts (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450)); Justin Indus., 
Inc. v. Choctaw Sec., 920 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1990) (“In general, materiality 
is a question reserved to the fact-finder.”); Sioux, Ltd., Sec. Litig. v. Coopers & 
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under-disclosure by limiting disclosure to relevant infor-
mation.159 This avoids excessively burdening companies, which 
practically cannot be expected to disclose every bit of known in-
formation.160 More importantly, this balance also ensures that 
investors are not overwhelmed with a surplus of irrelevant in-
formation.161 Additionally, the materiality standard is flexible, 
allowing the SEC and the judicial system to adapt to changing 
societal and economic concerns.162 It further allows companies to 
tailor the standard to their relevant industry and circum-
stances.163 This flexibility is critical for the SEC to effectively 
regulate the securities market, which is a dynamic and evolving 
space.164 These justifications underlie the standard present in 
several SEC regulations, including the 2004 Rule.165 
However, the SEC has declared particular events and cate-
gories of information as exceptions to this materiality standard, 
instead providing for a rule in these contexts of corporate disclo-
sures. The rules provide clarity in these particular contexts by 
 
Lybrand, 914 F.2d 61, 65–66 (5th Cir. 1990) (same) (quoting TSC Indus., 426 
U.S. at 450); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1985) (explain-
ing the test for materiality is an objective one (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 
445)); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 581, 584–85 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting 
that materiality turns on the facts); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th 
Cir. 1963) (analyzing specific facts to determine materiality). 
 159. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1689 (discussing the need for balanced 
rules). 
 160. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (articulating the SEC’s argument that required disclosure of immaterial 
information would burden companies with unmanageable disclosure expecta-
tions and would “significantly increase the costs to all involved without . . . cor-
responding benefits to investors generally”). 
 161. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, A.A. Sommer, Jr. Corporate Securities 
and Financial Law Lecture: The Importance of Independence (Oct. 3, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100113mjw#.VEasLvnF98E (“When dis-
closure gets to be too much or strays from its core purposes, it can lead to ‘infor-
mation overload’ . . . mak[ing] it difficult for investors to focus on information 
that is material and most relevant to their decision-making as investors in our 
financial markets.”). 
 162. See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 6–7, 14 (explaining that the 
definition of materiality may evolve overtime, and therefore, that when a socie-
tal concern becomes material, “disclosure of that information is already re-
quired”). 
 163. Id. at 6 (stating that the flexibility of the materiality standard allows 
its definition to vary according to the unique characteristics of each individual 
company). 
 164. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 73–1383, at 5–6 (1934) (describing the 
evolving nature of the securities market). 
 165. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (listing several SEC reg-
ulations that use the “reasonable investor” standard). 
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requiring that companies always disclose such events and infor-
mation upon occurrence.166 For example, the SEC requires com-
panies that use conflict minerals in the manufacture of its prod-
ucts to disclose whether those minerals originated in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.167 Ad-
ditionally, companies that perform resource extraction must re-
port any payments relating to commercial oil, natural gas, or 
mineral development made to a foreign government or the Fed-
eral Government as a party of their annual disclosures.168 Fi-
nally, the SEC requires companies to disclose the median of the 
annual total compensation of all employees and the annual total 
compensation of the company’s CEO.169 In each instance, the 
SEC provides explicit guidance to facilitate compliance.170 For 
example, in the conflict minerals rule, the agency explicitly de-
fines “conflict mineral,” listing four minerals and their deriva-
tives.171 
These bright-line rules demonstrate the SEC’s ability to reg-
ulate in response to congressional intent, shareholder interests, 
and external events.172 In each case, federal officials determined 
that disclosures addressing societal concerns—such as interna-
tional relations or disproportionate executive pay—should be 
made available to all shareholders. While these rules require the 
SEC to make a larger initial investment in order to provide the 
higher level of specificity, this greatly reduces the ambiguity and 
uncertainty as companies prepare their annual reports.173 More-
over, scholars continue to urge the SEC to expand this pool of 
exceptions to include information such as a company’s CEO’s 
health information.174 This trend, in combination with the SEC’s 
 
 166. These requirements have been promoted by mandatory legislation from 
Congress, but nonetheless demonstrate that specific disclosure requirements 
are within the SEC’s scope of authority.  
 167. Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2018). 
 168. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 249b. 
 169. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249. 
 170. But see BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 117, at 1–2 (arguing that devia-
tions from a facts-and-circumstances assessment of materiality wastes SEC re-
sources and buries shareholders in excessive immaterial information). 
 171. Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b. 
 172. See supra Part I.B (describing the factors that influence the SEC). 
 173. See supra notes 146, 150 and accompanying text (noting the costs and 
benefits of rules). 
 174. See Tom C. W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material 
Matters of Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 383–85 (2009) 
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willingness to enact rules in certain contexts, implies that the 
agency may enact a rule in the context of content data breaches. 
The next Section describes the benefits of a rule requiring disclo-
sure of content data breaches. 
C. THE RATIONALE FOR A RULE IN THIS CONTEXT 
Data breaches are speculative and occur frequently, causing 
confusion for companies and difficulty for the SEC in regulating 
companies—confusion and difficulty that could be eliminated by 
subjecting breaches to required disclosure. The rate of content 
data breaches is increasing at an alarming pace.175 Today, nearly 
all companies rely on data to grow their business, to improve 
their products or services, to better understand their customer 
bases, or to gain insight and manage increasing market complex-
ity and volatility through analytics.176 In this data-dependent 
climate, experts believe a company’s likelihood of experiencing a 
data breach is now “inevitable.”177 Companies are increasing 
 
(explaining why a CEO’s health is material); see also James D. Redwood, Qual-
itative Materiality Under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Dis-
closure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night? 1992 
WIS. L. REV. 315, 315 (1992) (arguing that the SEC should require disclosure of 
un-adjudicated illegal activity under the materiality standard). See generally 
Letter from Dorothy Donohue, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Sec. Regulation of Inv. Co. 
Inst., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (May 15, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-01-17/s70117-1751450-151844.pdf (responding to the SEC’s pro-
posed rule—requiring companies to disclose all material financial obligations, 
including “default[s] or similar events”—and arguing that the term “event” 
should specifically include “all defaults, accelerations, terminations, [and] mod-
ifications” rather than events that “reflect financial difficulties,” as proposed by 
the SEC). The proposed rule referenced in the letter was 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2 
–12. 
 175. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Hugo Moreno, Data Analytics Is No Longer a Nice Option—It’s the 
Core of the Enterprise, FORBES (June 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
forbesinsights/2017/06/12/data-analytics-is-no-longer-a-nice-option-its-the-core 
-of-the-enterprise/#60c0261677ec (surveying and analyzing responses from 
more than 300 executives across the world and finding that demand for data 
insights is increasing across all major industries and disciplines). 
 177. Kyle Balluck, Corporate Data Breaches ‘Inevitable,’ Expert Says, THE 
HILL (Nov. 30, 2014), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/225550 
-cybersecurity-expert-data-breaches-inevitable (recounting an interview with 
Dave DeWalt, the CEO of Fire Eye—a leading cybersecurity company—stating 
that ninety-seven percent of all companies are getting breached). DeWalt fur-
ther stated that hackers are “going to get in . . . But don’t let them access the 
information that’s really important. Don’t let them get back out with that infor-
mation. Detect it sooner. Respond sooner. And ultimately that exposure is very 
small.” Id. See also Peters, supra note 50 (quoting a former assistant chief liti-
gation counsel to the SEC, Matt Rossi, saying, “in the reality that we live in 
now, cyber breaches are going to be increasingly common”). 
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spending on cybersecurity programs, and investing resources 
aimed at continual oversight of such programs, but these efforts 
still do not eliminate the risk of a breach.178 Charles Kallenbach, 
a cybersecurity expert and the General Counsel at Heartland 
Payment Systems, likens a company’s database to a nice car, 
such that companies may lock their databases and hide the keys, 
yet nothing will keep a persistent thief away.179 
The speculative substance and form of data breaches, how-
ever, render them difficult for companies to manage and for the 
SEC to regulate.180 Given the certainty of a breach occurring, the 
uncertainty that currently exists in how to appropriately re-
spond to a breach is a cause for concern. Consider Equifax: after 
discovering its breach, the company dedicated forty days to de-
termining the breach’s scope and damage, before disclosing the 
intrusion to Equifax shareholders and to the public.181 This in-
vestigation is largely the product of a materiality standard, 
which allows for such flexibility in deciding whether to disclose 
the breach. Requiring disclosure in this context both reflects the 
benefits of a rule in general182 and remedies the harms of the 
 
 178. See Balluck, supra note 177 (quoting DeWalt [Fire Eye’s CEO], saying, 
“[t]his isn’t a lack of effort. Most companies are growing their security spend”); 
see also Joshua Vaughn, Into the Breach: Midstate Experts Say Data Breaches 
Are Inevitable, SENTINEL (July 20, 2014), https://cumberlink.com/news/local/ 
into-the-breach-midstate-experts-say-data-breaches-are-inevitable/article_ 
6c14ae56-0ebd-11e4-b51c-0019bb2963f4.html (stating that consumer desire for 
convenience in online shopping and banking has resulted in a state in which 
breaches and identity theft are inevitable); Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, At ACC 
Event, Experts Say Data Breaches Are Inevitable. So Now What?, CORP. COUNS. 
(Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/almID/1202754933830 (de-
scribing: (1) the Association of Corporate Counsel’s (ACC’s) state of cybersecu-
rity report, which found that fifty-six percent of companies are allocating more 
money to cybersecurity; and (2) a cybersecurity panel from the ACC’s mid-year 
meeting, at which a panelist stated that “[d]espite the increased awareness of 
cybersecurity issues, a lot of attacks are still pretty much impossible to pre-
vent”). 
 179. Williams-Alvarez, supra note 178. Kallenbach continued with his anal-
ogy, stating that his job as an attorney is “to make the neighbor’s car look more 
attractive to take than our car,” and urged corporations to take every possible 
minimal step to protect and to prioritize its data. Id. 
 180. See Shawn E. Tuma, Why Do Data Breach Disclosures Take So Long? 
Let’s Ask the SEC Chairman, MIS TRAINING INST. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://misti 
.com/infosec-insider/why-do-data-breach-disclosures-take-so-long-let-s-ask-the 
-sec-chairman (explaining that companies need “time, effort, and good forensics” 
to determine the effect of a data breach). 
 181. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
  
2122 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2095 
 
materiality standard as specifically applied to corporate disclo-
sure law.183 
Rules generally increase certainty, decrease official arbi-
trariness, and provide notice to regulated parties.184 Accord-
ingly, a rule requiring disclosure in this context would increase 
certainty and guidance, thereby eliminating the confusion, and 
facilitate regulated actors’ compliance. It would prevent arbi-
trary delays in regulated companies’ disclosure following a 
breach.185 To this end, the rule is specific. A company need not 
disclose every intrusion into its technological domain. As set 
forth in the Introduction, this Note defines a content data breach 
as one that compromises at least one thousand records contain-
ing consumers’ personally identifiable information.186 This spec-
ificity is similar to the SEC’s rule that explicitly defines “conflict 
mineral,” listing four minerals and their derivatives.187 In both 
cases—the existing rule and this Note’s proposed rule—the spec-
ificity narrows and focuses the rule’s applicability, which mini-
mizes potential imprecision.188 
Additionally, a rule in this context remedies the concerns of 
the materiality standard in corporate reporting. The “reasonable 
investor” standard provides an opportunity for hindsight bias in 
litigation, the creation of judicial and corporate numerical “rules 
of thumb,” and unequal discretion among firms of different 
sizes.189 This rule provides a forward-looking prescription, pre-
venting reliance on additional facts that are otherwise relied 
upon in litigation, such as empirical evidence, market reactions, 
and actual significance to the shareholders.190 For example, in 
litigation surrounding the fifty-state class action recently filed 
against Equifax, the court has the ability to reason based off of 
the actually incurred consequences of the breach.191 These con-
sequences include the thirty-three percent fall in share price, the 
 
 183. See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra Part II.A. 
 185. See Karen Freifeld, U.S. Companies Allowed to Delay Disclosure of Data 
Breaches, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-target-data-notification/u-s-companies-allowed-to-delay-disclosure-of-data 
-breaches-idUSBREA0F1LO20140116. 
 186. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 187. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1690 (“[T]he wider the scope of the rule, 
the more serious the imprecision becomes.”). 
 189. See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Tara Swaminatha, Equifax Now Hit with a Rare 50-State Class-
Action Lawsuit, CSO (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/ 
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allegations of insider trading, and the shareholders’ determina-
tion of significance,192 each of which is largely irrelevant in liti-
gating the violation of a rule.193 
Finally, a rule in this context creates an absolute threshold, 
in turn, removing firms’ and courts’ undesirable tendency to de-
velop their own rule-of-thumb thresholds for materiality under 
the “reasonable investor” standard.194 This further prevents “of-
ficial arbitrariness” in justifying delays or determining liabil-
ity.195 A rule provides an equal disclosure requirement for all 
firms, regardless of its size and “total mix” of information.196 This 
would prevent larger firms from enjoying greater flexibility than 
smaller companies in deciding when and whether to report a 
data breach.197 
Companies today are often global entities, as the internet 
allows an international presence from a local base.198 The spec-
ulative nature of data breaches—in both a breach’s scope and 
source and in whether or not to disclose—in combination with a 
patchwork of state reporting regulations199 and a vague federal 
reporting standard results in confusion. This confusion is then 
reflected in a company’s reporting conduct. The SEC has 
acknowledged this confusion and attempted to provide guidance 
twice in the past, to no avail. 
 
3238076/data-breach/equifax-now-hit-with-a-rare-50-state-class-action-lawsuit 
.html (discussing the details of the complaint); see also supra note 24 and ac-
companying text. 
 192. See supra notes 2, 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Sunstein, supra note 139, at 962. 
 194. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Nataly Kelly, Taking Your Brand Global Is Easier than You Think, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/taking-your-brand 
-global-is-ea (describing the process of going global as a “path,” rather than an 
“obstacle course”). 
 199. See, e.g., Andrea Peterson, Privacy Advocates: A National Data Breach 
Notification Standard Might Actually Make Things Worse, WASH. POST (Jan. 
12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/12/ 
privacy-advocates-a-national-data-breach-notification-standard-might-actually 
-make-things-worse/?utm_term=.9dadcab2c500 (explaining that today, forty-
seven states have enacted security breach notification laws). 
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D. EXISTING GUIDANCE IS INSUFFICIENT  
In 2011, the SEC issued guidance to address this confusion, 
instructing companies to discuss cybersecurity threats and inci-
dents in management’s discussion and analysis of financial con-
dition and results of operations (MD&A)200—a section of their 
annual reports.201 In reality, the SEC’s guidance statement con-
tained only abstract direction202 and proved relatively ineffective 
in subsequent corporate reporting.203 Even with perfect compli-
ance, a company may wait several months before disclosing a 
data breach at their next annual filing, such as Equifax’s forty-
day delay.204 During that waiting time, the company is incurring 
excessive costs to remediate the breach and increase security, as 
well as diverting resources toward the breach which otherwise 
may be directed toward furthering other business objectives.205 
On February 26, 2018, the SEC released additional guid-
ance to address the disclosure of data breaches.206 The guidance 
acknowledged several concerns and recognized several costs of 
data breaches that this Note has described.207 Furthermore, the 
 
 200. See id. 
 201. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 
75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231 and 241) (stating that 
MD&A requirements are intended to satisfy three objectives: “[(1)] To provide a 
narrative explanation of a company’s financial statements that enables inves-
tors to see the company through the eyes of management; [(2)] [t]o enhance the 
overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which financial in-
formation should be analyzed; and [(3)] [t]o provide information about the qual-
ity of, and the potential variability of, a company’s earnings and cash flow, so 
that investors can ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indicative 
of future performance.”). 
 202. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 49 (acknowledging that the 2011 
guidance statement was “principles based”). 
 203. See Freifeld, supra note 185 (quoting a former acting assistant attorney 
general at the U.S. Justice Department saying that since the 2011 guidance 
document was issued, “companies have tended to include generic risk factors 
rather than disclose specific incidents”); see also, e.g., Laura Northrup, Did Ya-
hoo Wait Too Long to Disclose Massive 2014 Data Breach? SEC Investigating, 
CONSUMERIST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://consumerist.com/2017/01/23/did-yahoo 
-wait-too-long-to-disclose-massive-2014-data-breach-sec-investigating (report-
ing that Yahoo experienced breaches in 2013 and 2014, but failed to disclose the 
breaches until 2016). 
 204. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Part III.B (discussing the negative impacts of a data breach 
on a company). 
 206. Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecu-
rity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166, 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229 and 249) [hereinafter 2018 Guidance]. 
 207. Id. at 8166–67. 
  
2019] MATERIAL BREACH & DISCLOSURE 2125 
 
guidance explains that a cybersecurity incident’s materiality de-
pends upon the incident’s nature, extent and potential magni-
tude, as well as the incident’s range of potential harm to a com-
pany’s reputation, financial performance, and customer and 
vendor relationships.208 Although perhaps more specific than the 
2011 guidance, this direction does not provide any more clarity 
than what previously existed. Instead, it lists every obvious fac-
tor that could be relevant to a company’s decision to disclose a 
data breach, and instructs the company to “make appropriate 
disclosure timely and sufficiently prior to the offer and sale of 
securities.”209 
Despite its recognizing the gravity of data breaches, the 
2018 guidance leniently concedes that determining the implica-
tions of a cybersecurity incident may require time, thus excusing 
reporting delays such as Equifax’s forty-day delay.210 In sum, 
this guidance kicks the can down the road. It encourages compa-
nies to continue reporting data breaches in the manner in which 
they are already reporting.211 Importantly, however, one of these 
manners is the Form 8-K, which the SEC “encourages companies 
to continue to use” to report cybersecurity incidents.212 In the 
guidance, the SEC states that it continues to “consider other 
means of promoting appropriate disclosure of cyber incidents.”213 
One such means, providing the most appropriate disclosure, is a 
rule mandating disclosure of content data breaches on a Form 8-
K, a vehicle of disclosure that the SEC has now formally en-
dorsed. 
III.  THE RULE IN PRACTICE: PROTECTING INVESTORS 
AND PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY   
This Part explores the details of the rule and its potential 
impact. It argues that required disclosure of content data 
breaches furthers the purposes of corporate disclosure laws and 
promotes informed investment by increasing transparency. Fi-
nally, this Part addresses likely concerns with the proposed rule. 
 
 208. Id. at 8169. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at 8168–69 (providing examples of current content data breach re-
porting options). 
 212. Id. at 8168. 
 213. Id. at 8167. 
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A. THE RULE 
This Note proposes the following rule: companies subject to 
SEC regulations must disclose content data breaches as material 
impairments within four days of discovery by way of the SEC’s 
Form 8-K (hereinafter referred to as the Content Data Breach 
Disclosure Rule, or CDBD Rule). For purposes of this Note “con-
tent data breach” is defined as a data breach that has compro-
mised at least one thousand records containing consumers’ per-
sonally identifiable information. 
Several definitions of a data breach exist, though all are var-
iations of a theme describing a “confirmed incident in which sen-
sitive, confidential or otherwise protected data has been accessed 
and/or disclosed in an unauthorized fashion.”214 The CDBD Rule 
embraces the notions of unauthorized access and compromised 
data, while quantitatively limiting the scope of the rule’s ap-
plicability. The limitation recognizes the reality that data 
breaches are not always dramatic infiltrations by malicious 
hackers.215 The numerical threshold—1000 records—aims to 
eliminate the risk of requiring company disclosure for day-to-day 
breaches.216 As mentioned in the Introduction, this number 
comes from a Ponemon Institute study, sponsored by IBM Secu-
rity, (hereinafter referred to as the “Ponemon Study”) that de-
fines a material data breach as “one that involves a minimum of 
1,000 lost or stolen records containing personal information 
about consumers or customers.”217 The Ponemon Study is well-
respected and often cited by technology companies and cyberse-
curity experts when discussing various aspects of data 
breaches.218 Nonetheless, this number remains a somewhat ar-
bitrary threshold, and thus provides an opportunity for future 
work and input from cybersecurity experts. 
 
 214. Data Breach, TECHTARGET, https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/ 
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Personally identifiable information (PII) is a familiar con-
cept throughout privacy law, including state data breach notifi-
cation laws.219 The CDBD Rule takes advantage of this familiar-
ity, defining PII as “any piece of information which can 
potentially be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a sin-
gle person.”220 This can include street addresses, device IP ad-
dresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, driver’s li-
censes, and vehicle registrations.221 PII’s presence throughout 
federal and state laws captures its general acceptance as an ap-
propriate benchmark in the technological domain.222 Addition-
ally, the Ponemon Study employs PII in its definition of “data 
breach,” demonstrating the cybersecurity industry’s acceptance 
of this term.223 
In sum, the CDBD Rule incorporates recognized and appro-
priate terms and definitions. This familiarity prevents the rule 
from surprising corporations. Companies can measure one thou-
sand records and identify records containing PII. This ultimately 
reflects the benefits of a rule-based approach, replacing uncer-
tain reporting standards with concrete definitions and thresh-
olds.224 Moreover, the rule itself operates to protect investors and 
increase transparency, ultimately achieving the purposes of cor-
porate disclosure. 
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B. PROTECTING INVESTORS BY ACKNOWLEDGING SHAREHOLDER 
HARM 
The SEC was created in order to advance the purposes of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.225 These Acts aim to pro-
mote transparency in order to enhance informed investments, 
and ultimately, to protect the investors.226 Purchasing stock is 
one vehicle for the public to invest in a company.227 As such, a 
company’s stock share price is a direct reflection of a share-
holder’s investment, and thus, his or her interest.228 While an 
increase in share price benefits the shareholder, a decrease in 
share price harms the shareholder. When this harm is created 
or accompanied by a lack of corporate transparency, it offends 
and runs counter to the purposes of the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act. Content data breaches are corporate events that 
often decrease a company’s stock price. Therefore, shareholder 
harm resulting from content data breaches requires SEC reme-
diation. The CDBD Rule serves as such remediation. 
The effects of a content data breach, including direct and in-
direct costs, were discussed in Part I, above.229 These types of 
damages and harms trigger disclosure under Form 8-K. In the 
2004 Rule, the SEC states that Item 2.06 requires disclosure 
when a company concludes that there has been a “material 
charge for impairment to one or more of its assets, including, 
without limitation, an impairment of securities or goodwill.”230 A 
content data breach impairs both securities, evidenced by an im-
mediate and extended decrease in stock price and direct costs of 
a data breach,231 and goodwill, evidenced through the indirect 
costs of a data breach.232 These impairments harm shareholders 
directly—by decreasing the value of the company233—and indi-
rectly—by diverting costs from growth or strategic progress, and 
decreasing shareholder trust. 
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Considering that corporate disclosures strive to protect in-
vestors, these harms should be reported as early as possible. To 
be clear, this Note does not take the position that the CDBD Rule 
will necessarily remedy the costs of a data breach, but rather 
that these costs harm investors, and thus, a company is obli-
gated to inform its investors of a content data breach. Histori-
cally, the SEC has acted to protect investors in response to ex-
ternal events that make certain information more relevant to a 
company’s shareholders.234 The era of content data breaches, 
and its corresponding effect on shareholder interests, is precisely 
the type of event that should trigger SEC action. 
C. PROMOTING INFORMED INVESTMENT BY INCREASING 
CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY 
The CDBD Rule would resolve existing confusion and con-
cern among companies, attorneys, and accountants regarding cy-
bersecurity-related disclosure.235 The Form 8-K requires compa-
nies to report material impairments within four days of a 
triggering event.236 When the SEC amended Form 8-K in 2004, 
the agency expanded the Form’s scope in order to prevent the 
delayed disclosure that existed under the previous Form 8-K, 
aiming to benefit investors by “assimilat[ing] such undisclosed 
information into the value of a company’s securities.”237 Per the 
CDBD Rule, required disclosure within four days would provide 
investors with transparency during the company’s entire recov-
ery period. The SEC’s lenient approach may have been appropri-
ate in the past, when the market was first facing concerns re-
lated to cybersecurity incidents, but that time has since 
passed.238 Congress established the SEC in order to regulate in 
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accordance with changing times and provided it with the flexi-
bility and resources necessary to target developments such as 
the inevitability of data breaches.239 
Periodic reporting and Form 8-K allow companies to contin-
ually provide the public with important information as it arises. 
By creating the CDBD Rule, the SEC would provide transpar-
ency with regard to a prominent corporate issue—content data 
breaches.240 This transparency may operate to increase investor 
confidence in the market,241 in turn, reducing the amount of 
speculation relating to cybersecurity incidents.242 Under existing 
circumstances, shareholders are largely uncertain of how to re-
spond to data breach and often sell their shares in a panic, at-
tempting to distance themselves from the breached company.243 
In this context, mandated disclosure through the CDBD Rule 
would reveal the true prevalence of data breaches,244 which per-
haps would diminish shareholders’ instinctual hostile reaction 
and provide more rational market reactions to data breaches. In 
return, this may reduce companies’ resistance to fully and trans-
parently disclosing data breaches in the future, providing more 
rational market reactions. 
Greater transparency, greater confidence, and reduced spec-
ulation would ultimately encourage capital formation, invest-
ment, and growth in this country’s economic state.245 Even if 
such lofty hopes are unavailing, a rule requiring disclosure of 
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content data breaches nonetheless facilitates informed invest-
ing. At a minimum, a rule will provide investors important, rel-
evant information as they navigate the securities market, allow-
ing an investor to form an “intelligent basis for forming his 
judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells.”246 
Thus, the rule facilitates informed investments, which directly 
satisfies President Roosevelt’s directive to Congress in 1933,247 
and Congress’s hopes for the Exchange Act.248 
D. REJECTING OBJECTIONS 
Companies often postpone reporting a content data 
breach.249 At the time of disclosure, companies justify this delay 
by explaining it was investigating and identifying the accurate 
scope and damage of the breach, attempting to avoid premature 
disclosure.250 In its 2018 guidance, the SEC accepts these inves-
tigations and disclosure delays as understandable.251 This argu-
ment embodies the speculative nature of content data breaches, 
as companies attempt to avoid premature disclosure, preferring 
instead to have as many facts as possible before publicly report-
ing the incident.252 Accordingly, the SEC’s 2004 proposed 
amendments to Form 8-K were met with opposition. In response 
to Item 2.06, commentators noted that material impairments 
“can occur over time, making it difficult to determine the exact 
date of the triggering event.”253 Moreover, commentators be-
lieved the annual reports were better suited to address these 
events, because discussing a single piece of information outside 
of the context of the entire financial statements would be “diffi-
cult and potentially misleading.”254 The SEC, however, was not 
convinced. 
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The agency responded to these concerns by stating that it 
believes it is “important for investors to receive this information 
on a current basis.”255 This response reflects Congress’s intent to 
prioritize transparency and promote informed investment.256 
The SEC further stated that by tying the reporting deadline to 
the board’s, a committee’s, or an officer’s discovery of a content 
data breach, the timing of disclosure is “sufficiently precise.”257 
Over a decade later, the SEC continues to endorse companies’ 
using a Form 8-K to disclose data breaches.258 Nonetheless, the 
SEC acknowledged in its Final 2004 Rule that the discovery of a 
data breach can often occur in conjunction with preparing, re-
viewing, or auditing financial statements during the develop-
ment of periodic reports.259 Thus, if a company discovers a con-
tent data breach while preparing quarterly or annual reports 
and it plans to disclose the breach in the relevant report, then 
Form 8-K disclosure is not required260 and the CDBD Rule would 
not be triggered. Beyond such circumstances, the SEC was, is, 
and should be unwilling to sympathize with the commentators’ 
concerns. 
Moreover, existing sources of regulation mitigate commen-
tators’ concerns by demonstrating the capability of rapid disclo-
sure. As the threat and inevitability of data breaches has gained 
increased recognition, various regulatory bodies have instituted 
reporting deadlines for cybersecurity incidents.261 For example, 
Europe’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) es-
tablishes a seventy-two hour—or three-day—reporting deadline 
for data breaches.262 The GDPR—effective May 25, 2018—re-
quires entities to disclose any discovered breach within seventy-
two hours, unless the breach is “unlikely to result in a risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons.”263 Similarly, in 2017, 
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New York became the first state to implement detailed regula-
tions applicable to financial services entities, including banks, 
insurance companies, brokers, and others.264 This regulation—
effective March 1, 2017—requires covered entities to take cer-
tain proactive measures, including reporting all cybersecurity 
events and breaches to the Department of Financial Services 
within seventy-two hours.265 Inspired by New York’s regulation, 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted a 
seventy-two hour reporting deadline in October, 2017, for any 
cybersecurity event resulting in “unauthorized access to, disrup-
tion or misuse of, an Information System or information stored 
on such Information System.”266 
These reporting deadlines not only signal the increased ur-
gency in requiring disclosure of cybersecurity incidents, but also 
demonstrate that despite the speculative nature of data 
breaches, immediate disclosure is in fact possible. For example 
on October 5, 2017, a security expert notified an online comment-
ing system, Disqus, that it had been breached in 2012.267 Within 
just twenty-four hours, Disqus had contacted possibly-affected 
users and disclosed the breach to the public.268 In the face of new 
regulations and reporting deadlines, one can hardly argue that 
Disqus is an anomaly, such that its rapid disclosure is not repli-
cable by others. Instead, companies everywhere must likewise 
prioritize these reporting responsibilities. As corporations today 
can reach further with fewer resources,269 centralized regulation 
is likely most effective. Accordingly, the centralized SEC is the 
appropriate body to unify corporate reporting practices with re-
gard to content data breaches by way of the CDBD Rule. 
  CONCLUSION   
Corporate disclosure law has historically been viewed as a 
framework, or patchwork, of vague requirements, rules, and reg-
ulations.270 This view rings true in the field of cybersecurity. 
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Technology continues to develop and companies continue to in-
corporate this developing technology into their business and op-
erations. In the face of these developments, the rate of content 
data breaches is rising.271 In this field, disclosure is muddied by 
an inarticulate standard of materiality, an issue that is engulf-
ing the corporate domain, with no further guidance from the 
SEC.272 
Content data breaches provide the SEC with the oppor-
tunity to resolve a small amount of the overwhelming ambiguity. 
They are a discrete issue. They are capable of objective identifi-
cation. They are destructive. They are material events which 
should mandate disclosure to the public. The CDBD Rule, re-
quiring disclosure of content data breaches as material impair-
ments under Item 2.06 of Form 8-K, will increase transparency 
in the capital market. This proposition finds its basis in Presi-
dent’s Roosevelt instruction to Congress in 1933 to decrease 
speculation in the marketplace.273 It finds support in its ad-
vantages in comparison to an unclear standard.274 Finally, this 
solution finds its benefit in its practical application—protecting 
investors and enhancing informed investment.275 This require-
ment provides a more secure and reliable market, ultimately 
fueling investments and strengthening corporate America. 
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